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Abstract 
I begin by contrasting three approaches one can take to the 
distinction between the essential and accidental properties: an 
ontological, a deflationary, and a mind-dependent approach.  I then 
go on to apply that distinction to the necessary a posteriori, and 
defend the deflationist view.  Finally I apply the distinction to modal 
truth in general and argue that the deflationist position lets us avoid 
an otherwise pressing problem for the actualist: the problem of 
accounting for the source of modal truth. 
 
Modal Properties 
 
Compare two positions with respect to modality de re.  Both positions accept Lewis’ 
ontology of concrete possibilia2 but while one, counterpart theory3, holds that each 
concrete object is world-bound the other, modal realism with overlap4, holds that 
there are literal trans-world identities. 
 
According to the counterpart theorist, what it is for an object to be essentially Φ is for 
all the counterparts of that object to be Φ; likewise, an object is accidentally Φ iff it is 
Φ but has counterparts that are not Φ.  The modal realist with overlap, on the other 
hand, holds that an object is essentially Φ iff it is Φ in every world in which it – that 
very object, not a counterpart of it – exists; likewise, an object is accidentally Φ iff it 
is Φ but is not Φ in some world in which it exists. 
 
If an object is literally present in many worlds, then how can its properties vary from 
world to world?  How can Sara be sitting (because she is sitting in the actual world); 
and also not sitting (because she is not sitting in another world)?  Doesn’t this amount 
to a single object having the contradictory property of sitting and not sitting?  This 
problem is exactly analogous to the problem of temporarily true predications: if Sara 
wasn’t sitting but now is, isn’t she both sitting and not sitting?  And since modal 
realism with overlap is analogous to endurentism5, one would expect the modal realist 
                                                 
1 Thanks to Elizabeth Barnes, Katherine Hawley, Peter Simons, Robbie Williams and Dean 
Zimmerman, for helpful discussion on issues dealt with here.  I owe special thanks to an anonymous 
referee for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research who gave me excellent feedback on an earlier 
version of this paper; s/he went above and beyond the call of duty, and taking into account his/her 
comments improved the paper immensely. 
2 Lewis (1986) is the classic presentation of Lewis’ concrete realism about possibilia. 
3 Lewis (1983a) sets out the formal apparatus of counterpart theory.  See also Lewis (1983b) for 
significant philosophical developments in Lewis’ thought concerning that theory. 
4 See McDaniel (2004) for the development of such a theory. 
5 Objects wholly exist at every world at which they exist, just as, for the endurantist, objects wholly 
exist at every time at which they exist.  The analogous position to counterpart theory in the persistence 
debate is stage theory.  The stage theorist claims that objects are time-bound – they exist only for an 
with overlap to treat contingently true predications much like the endurantist handles 
temporarily true predications.  One option is to simply index property and relation 
instantiation to worlds, so a is neither F nor not F simpliciter, but rather F-at-w and 
not F-at-w*; but such a view has its drawbacks.6 A better option7 is to distinguish 
between regions of space-time and material objects: the former we treat as 
worldbound; the latter, as non-worldbound.  Property-instantiation is then taken to be 
relative to these worldbound regions of spacetime rather than to worlds.  Worlds are 
identified with certain regions of spacetime: those such that each part of that region is 
spatio-temporally related to every other part, and not spatio-temporally related to any 
other region of spacetime.  So an object a could be F iff a is F relative to some region 
of spacetime, R, which is a part of some possible world w.  So Sara is sitting relative 
to some region of spacetime which is a part of that region of spacetime which is the 
actual world, and not sitting relative to some other region of spacetime which is part 
of some non-actual world. 
 
Now, it is natural to think that the modal realist with overlap treats modal properties 
as more “ontologically robust” than the counterpart theorist.  Both theorists agree that 
a distinction is carved between the essential and the accidental properties of a thing, 
but the modal realist with overlap seems to think of the carving with more 
metaphysical seriousness.  What does this extra ontological robustness amount to? 
 
A first thought, but one that will be rejected, is that for the modal realist with overlap 
the distinction is carved by the world8, whereas for the counterpart theorist the 
distinction is carved, in some sense, by us.  The modal realist with overlap, after all, 
thinks that what properties a thing has essentially or accidentally is determined by 
what properties that thing has in each world in which it exists, and certainly this is 
nothing to do with us.  But for the counterpart theorist what properties a thing has 
essentially or accidentally is determined by what properties its counterparts have; and 
whether or not a thing is a counterpart of another thing is determined by whether or 
not it is similar in relevant respects to that thing; and whether or not two things are 
relevantly similar is determined by us, since we decide on the standards of similarity 
that are relevant.  For example, the clay could be squashed because it has counterparts 
which are squashed; it has counterparts which are squashed because squashed things 
are relevantly similar to it; but that squashed things are relevantly similar to the clay 
is because we are thinking about the clay qua clay, and not qua statue.  Had we been 
thinking about the clay qua statue the relevant similarity relation would not have held 
between the clay and a squashed thing, and so the clay could not have been squashed.  
Since the standards of relevance are up to us, it would be easy to conclude that 
whether an object is Φ essentially or accidentally is likewise up to us on the 
                                                                                                                                            
instant – and analyses ‘a will be F’ as ‘a has some future temporal counterpart who is F’.  For defences 
of stage theory see Hawley (2001) and Sider (2001).  Perdurantism is analogous to the doctrine that 
things have modal parts: so for every world in which the object (wholly or partly) exists, it has a part 
that wholly exists in that world and which does not (even partly) exist in any other world; on this view 
‘a could be F’ is true iff a has a modal part that is F (simpliciter). 
6 It does not allow for a reduction of modality; see McDaniel (ibid. p143) 
7 This is very condensed: for details see McDaniel (ibid. p145-153).  In particular, one needs two 
distinct parthood relations if this account is to avoid commitment to mereological essentialism: a two-
place parthood relation ‘x is a part of y’ that applies to regions of spacetime, and a three-place parthood 
relation ‘x is a part of y at region R’ which applies to material objects. 
8 Or, perhaps better (since we are supposing there not to be just one world but many), carved by reality. 
counterpart theorist’s story.9  So the sense in which the modal realist with overlap 
treats the distinction between the essential and accidental with more ontological 
robustness than the counterpart theorist is, it might be thought, that they hold that the 
world draws the distinction whereas the counterpart theorist holds that we draw it. 
 
That thought is seductive, but not quite right.  The above thought has the counterpart 
theorist sounding like an anti-realist about modal properties: as thinking that whether 
or not an object is essentially Φ is a mind-dependent matter.  But between the modal 
realist with overlap and a real anti-realist concerning modal properties – one who 
holds that what it is for an object to be essentially Φ is for it to be inconceivable that 
the object is not Φ, for example – the counterpart theorist is clearly closer to the 
modal realist with overlap. 
 
It is a mistake to think that according to counterpart theory it is a mind-dependent 
matter whether or not a thing has a certain modal property.  Consider the property we 
are attributing to the clay when we say it could be squashed.  It is true that were we to 
utter the words “the statue could be squashed” we would utter a falsehood.  But that is 
not because this one thing has different properties depending on whether or not it is 
thought of as the statue or as the clay, rather it is because in referring to the thing as 
the statue we create a context in which the property that we truly predicated of the 
clay no longer deserves to be called the property could be squashed. 
 
This is a familiar phenomenon.  It is true to say of me that I am tall, but it would be 
false to say that of me were I attending a convention of basketball players, and that’s 
because the standards of tallness have shifted.  But that obviously doesn’t make it a 
mind-dependent matter whether or not I am tall.  I need not have undergone any (non-
Cambridge) change between the time when it is true to say that I am tall and the time 
when it is false to say that of me; all that has happened is that it has become no longer 
appropriate to say of that property that I have that it is the property of being tall.  
Similarly, it is true that the statue has the property the clay was said to have when we 
said that the clay could be squashed; but when we speak of that one thing as the statue 
it is no longer appropriate to describe that property so.  When speaking of the thing as 
the statue we are in a context in which ‘could be squashed’ picks out the property of 
having squashed statue-counterparts; when speaking of the thing as the clay we are in 
a context in which ‘could be squashed’ picks out the property of having squashed 
clay-counterparts.  The statue/clay has the property of having squashed clay-
counterparts but it does not have the property of having squashed statue-counterparts; 
this is a mind-independent, context-independent truth that is settled by how things are, 
and has nothing at all to do with us.  What’s up to us is just which of these properties 
‘could be squashed’ picks out.  But there’s nothing special about counterpart theory 
here: it’s always up to us what our words pick out. 
 
If we accept the Lewisian picture of properties as sets of possible individuals the 
picture is this.  When you truly say, outside the basketball players’ convention, that I 
am tall, the truth-conditions of this are that I am a member of a certain set – the set of 
all the tall people in all the possible worlds – call it TallSet.  When you truly say at the 
basketball players’ convention that I am not tall, it is not that I am no longer a 
                                                 
9 Of course there is a variant of Lewisian counterpart theory which only has one counterpart relation, 
but I will ignore this option. 
member of TallSet.  That would be nonsense: sets cannot change their members over 
time.  I am a member of TallSet during the basketball players’ convention if I ever 
am; all that has happened is that the term ‘the property being tall’ is picking out a 
different set of possibilia – one that includes (at least some of) these basketball 
players, but not me – call that set SuperTallSet.  I am not a member of SuperTallSet, 
nor have I ever been; so I do not have, nor have I ever had, the property that is 
SuperTallSet.  So my properties are remaining constant here: what is changing is 
simply how those properties are appropriately described. 
 
Likewise, when I say of the clay that it could be squashed, the truth-conditions of this 
are that it is a member of certain set – the set of all the possibilia which have squashed 
counterparts – call it SquashSet.  The clay does indeed have this property because it is 
a member of SquashSet; and of course the statue has that very property as well, since 
the statue is the clay and whether or not a thing is a member of a set is not a context-
dependent matter.  But in speaking of the statue/clay as the statue we create a context 
in which it is no longer appropriate to describe SquashSet as the set of all the 
possibilia which have squashed counterparts, since it includes the statue/clay as a 
member, and the counterpart relation invoked is such that this thing has no squashed 
counterparts.  So the thing’s properties are not changing from context to context here: 
what is changing is simply how those properties are appropriately described. 
 
The sense in which the distinction between the essential and accidental properties is 
more ontologically robust for the modal realist with overlap than for the counterpart 
theorist is nothing to do with mind-dependence or mind-independence.  To think 
otherwise is a mistake based on confusing the phenomenon of the appropriate 
description of a thing’s properties changing from context to context with the 
phenomenon of a thing’s genuinely changing its properties from context to context.  
The sense in which the modal realist with overlap treats the essential/accidental 
distinction more robustly is this: that for the modal realist with overlap, modal 
properties are very natural, whereas for the counterpart theorist they are very 
unnatural. 
 
The distinction between natural and unnatural properties is as familiar as it is hard to 
analyse.  Natural properties carve the world at its joints, unnatural properties do not; 
natural properties account for objective similarity, unnatural properties do not.  Being 
charged is (reasonably) natural: there is a natural distinction between the charged 
things and the uncharged things: all the charged things objectively resemble one 
another in virtue of sharing this property, and they do not resemble any uncharged 
thing in this respect.  Being charged or a microwave oven, on the other hand, is pretty 
unnatural.  There is no natural distinction between the things that are either charged or 
microwave ovens and things that are neither.  Nor do two things objectively resemble 
one another simply because they share this property. 
 
For the modal realist with overlap, modal properties are very natural.  To be possibly 
Φ is to be Φ at some world, and to be Φ at a world w is to occupy some region R that 
is a part of w, and to be Φ at R.  So what it is to be possibly Φ can be analysed in 
terms of parthood, region, and occupation, and these look to be good candidates for 
highly natural properties.  For the counterpart theorist, on the other hand, modal 
properties are pretty unnatural.  To be possibly Φ is to have a counterpart that is Φ, 
which is to be sufficiently similar to something that is Φ.  But the standards of 
similarity can be so unnatural that to be possibly Φ is very unnatural as a result.  To 
make the point salient, consider Lewis’ account of how the counterpart theorist can be 
a truthmaker theorist.  Lewis said that the counterpart theorist needed to focus on a 
special kind of counterpart relation: the counterpart relation invoked by thinking of 
things qua truthmakers.10  Particularly interesting is his (together with Gideon Rosen) 
story concerning negative existentials11: the truthmaker for <there are no unicorns> 
(say) is the world qua unaccompanied by unicorns.  Ordinarily, it is true to say that 
the world could have contained unicorns; but when we speak of the world qua 
unaccompanied by unicorns we invoke a counterpart relation according to which there 
is no counterpart of the world which contains a unicorn.  It is true, then, to say that the 
world qua unaccompanied by unicorns has the property essentially contains no 
unicorns.  This is a highly unnatural property.  The members of the set that is this 
property do not objectively resemble each other to a high degree.  Two worlds can be 
unalike as you want except that they must both contain no unicorns and they will 
‘resemble’ each other in this respect; but that is no more genuine a resemblance than 
the resemblance you and I share in virtue of both not being beanbags. 
 
We can discern, then, three positions with respect to modal properties and the sense in 
which the distinction between the essential and the accidental is determined by the 
mind-independently existing reality.  The first position is that reality carves a natural 
joint between the essential and the accidental properties; the second that reality makes 
a division between the essential and the accidental properties, but that it is not a joint 
in reality – it is an unnatural distinction; the third position is that there is no such 
distinction in reality – the distinction is a mind-dependent one.  Let us call these three 
positions the ontological view, the deflationary view and the anti-realist view 
respectively. 
 
The necessary a posteriori 
 
Let us turn to the necessary a posteriori: truths of form <Necessarily, water is H2O>, 
or <Necessarily, gold has atomic number 79>.  Here we face an analogous choice 
between the ontological, the deflationary, and the mind-dependence view.  According 
to the deflationary view, the necessary a posteriori is primarily a linguistic 
phenomenon rather than a metaphysical one.  The phenomenon of the necessary a 
posteriori arises, on this view, from considerations about how we properly describe 
certain situations.  The lesson we should take from Kripke and Putnam, so the view 
goes, is that we can only know a posteriori that certain sentences truly describe every 
possible situation.  But that is not because we need empirical evidence to discover that 
the state of affairs that those sentences claim to obtain obtains necessarily; rather it is 
because we need empirical evidence to discover just what state of affairs those 
sentences claim to obtain.  If I utter the sentence ‘there is some non-H2O water 
around’ then I utter a necessary falsehood.  Why?  Because the state of affairs that 
sentence claims to obtain is one where there is some of the H2O substance in its liquid 
form that is not H2O.  That state of affairs cannot obtain, and I know a priori that it 
cannot obtain; but what I cannot know a priori is that that is the state of affairs said to 
obtain by that sentence.  To know that I need to discover the chemical composition of 
water: I need to know that water is the H2O substance in its liquid form.  There is no 
                                                 
10 Lewis (2003) 
11 Lewis and Rosen (2003) 
claim here that ‘water’ means ‘the H2O substance’ – that is not plausible, since we 
understood the term ‘water’ before we knew anything of chemical theory; rather the 
claim is simply that knowing the meaning of the words in a sentence is not always 
sufficient to know what state of affairs is said to obtain by that sentence.  Sometimes 
we must also know some a posteriori facts about the things that our words talk about. 
 
The phenomenon of the necessary a posteriori arises, according to the deflationist, 
because there are certain sentences which truly describe every possible world but 
which can only be discovered to do so by empirical means.  The phenomenon of the 
necessary a posteriori does not require us to admit that there are worlds which are 
impossible which we can only discover to be impossible by empirical means.  Our 
opinion on what worlds are (metaphysically) possible did not change post 
Kripke/Putnam, says the deflationist; all that changed was our opinion on how some 
of those worlds are correctly described, which has an impact on our opinion as to 
what sentences are necessary (or, if you prefer, what sentences express necessary 
truths). 
 
I have a great deal of sympathy for the deflationist story here.  The most convincing 
consideration, to my mind, that water couldn't have been anything other than H2O is 
the Twin Earth thought experiment.  We were asked to consider a world in which 
there is a counterpart of Earth where the clear, odourless, colourless liquid that falls 
from the sky, makes plants grow, quenches thirst etc is not H2O but XYZ, and then 
asked whether or not this is a world which contains water.  We answer that it isn't.  
Now what is crucial is that what the Twin Earth example elicits from us is an opinion 
about how we should describe the world in question.  It's not, or so it seems to me, 
that one of the ways we thought a possible way the world could be turned out not to 
be possible; it's that it turned out that we were misdescribing one of the possible ways 
for the world to be as a way according to which water was not H2O, when in fact the 
proper description is that it is a way for the world to be in which there is no water, but 
merely twater.  Our conception of the underlying modal facts, then, is no different 
post Kripke/Putnam from how it was pre Kripke/Putnam; all that changed was our 
opinions on how to properly describe those facts: on what sentences express truths as 
a result of the modal facts being what they are.  What Kripke and Putnam did is 
convince us that some of the possibilities were being misdescribed; and the 
phenomenon of the necessary a posteriori arises because to know whether or not a 
possible situation is properly described as one where there is water we need to do 
some empirical work – we need to discover the actual chemical composition of water. 
 
Contrast this with the ontological view: a view which places ontological importance 
on the necessary a posteriori.  Consider, for the sake of illustration, a view according 
to which there are two distinct universals: a simple universal of being water and a 
structured universal of being H2O.  Something is water iff it instantiates the being 
water universal, and it is H2O iff it instantiates the structured universal of being H2O.  
Now certainly there is no logical contradiction in something instantiating one and not 
the other but, according to this view, such a situation is metaphysically impossible.  
On this view the necessity of water being H2O is not simply a result of how we 
describe the space of possible worlds – whether or not something instantiates the 
water universal is independent of whether or not we would call that something 
‘water’.  This view claims that there are two distinct universals which as a matter of 
necessity must be either both instantiated by a substance or both uninstantiated.  In 
contrast to the deflationary theorist this theorist thinks that we did learn something 
about what worlds were possible from Kripke/Putnam, not just about how to correctly 
describe the space of possible worlds.  According to this theorist we can only know a 
posteriori what situations are possible.  A priori reasoning cannot reveal that the world 
where something instantiates the water universal but not the H2O structured universal 
is an impossible world. 
 
That way of taking the necessary a posteriori with ontological seriousness is not very 
attractive, but I am merely aiming at the moment to illustrate the distinction, and I 
hope I have done that.  That particular theory is not very attractive because it is not 
very plausible to think that there are two distinct universals, the water universal and 
the H2O universal.  If you believe in universals it is likely that you only believe in 
simple universals corresponding to sparse properties and complex universals 
constituted from them; you will probably not believe in a simple universal of being 
water.  If you want to take abundant properties such as being water with ontological 
seriousness, chances are you take them to be something like functions from possible 
worlds to sets of individuals.  Assume that is the case.  So the property of being water 
is a function such that when it takes a world w as its argument it yields as its value the 
singleton of the substance water, or perhaps the set of all the water molecules, in w.  
So there are indeed two distinct properties – the structured universal being H2O is not 
identical to this function – but nevertheless this is a road back to deflationism.  For the 
reason that nothing can be water and not H2O according to this view is not plausibly 
to be taken as the result of some necessary connection between the structured 
universal being H2O and the function being water, as is the case according to the 
previous view, but rather because our usage of the term ‘water’ is such that the term 
would not apply to any function which took you from a world to a thing in that world 
that did not instantiate the H2O structured universal.  And so the peculiarity of the 
necessary a posteriori remains wordy rather than worldly. 
 
It is only knowable a posteriori that our usage of the term ‘water’ imposes such a 
constraint on what function is the property of being water, for it is obviously not 
analytic of the term ‘water’ that a function is only the property of being water if it 
never takes you from a world to a non-H2O substance in that world; rather the view 
would be that it is analytic of the term ‘water’ that a function is only the property of 
being water if it never takes you from a world to a substance in that world which has a 
different chemical composition from the actual watery stuff.  Since it is an empirical 
matter what that chemical composition is it is an empirical matter what the constraint 
is that is placed on whether or not a function deserves to be called the ‘being water’ 
property.  Again then, according to this view we know a priori the space of 
possibilities but we do not know a priori how to describe the space of possibilities, 
because in order to know that the function that takes you from the Twin Earth world 
to the watery XYZ stuff is not the property of being water you need to know that 
water is not in fact XYZ. 
 
The connection with the case of modal properties should be fairly clear.  The 
ontological theorist – one who postulates a necessary connection between two distinct 
universals: the water universal and the H2O universal – thinks that the necessary a 
posteriori has its source in very natural features of logical space: what universals there 
are and where they are instantiated.  Those are natural features par excellence.  The 
deflationist gives reality a less important role.  The necessary a posteriori arises as a 
result of how we use kind terms.  That’s not to say that it is merely a matter of 
convention that <water is H2O> is necessary, of course; the deflationist agrees with 
the ontological theorist that these facts are mind-independent, worldly facts.  They’re 
just not that interesting for the deflationist!  The ontological theorist thinks she has 
discovered necessary connections between distinct existences; she is rejecting what 
Lewis thought was the fundamental principle that guided us in our modal 
epistemology: the Humean denial of necessary connections.12  The deflationist makes 
no such claim.  According to the deflationist, all that’s going on is that the kind term 
‘water’ picks out the chemical kind and not the phenomenal kind.  But it’s not that the 
chemical kind is somehow a better candidate, more eligible (to think that would be to 
move back to an ontological view); that’s just what we do.  There would be no facts 
about modal space we would be missing were we to have used ‘water’ to pick out the 
phenomenal kind instead; nor would we be using the term to pick out a less eligible 
candidate. 
 
What would the third position – the anti-realist view – look like with respect to the 
necessary a posteriori?  Glimpses of such a view can be seen in Putnam.  Putnam said 
that he wanted to accept the necessary a posteriori but to “assimilate [Kripke's] 
metaphysical intuitions to . . . linguistic intuitions.”13  To arrive at “a theory which 
was related to Kripke's, but which was stripped of metaphysical assumptions to the 
point where Carnap might have accepted it.”14  Now that sounds to me like the 
deflationist thought, but he then goes on to say15 
 
[For Kripke] statements about “this table” [or about water, gold, this 
person etc] require . . . an intuitive knowledge of what is “essential” to the 
table – an intuitive grasp of the limits of the possibilities in which the 
hypothetical object would bear the primitive logical relation “=” to the 
table I am pointing to [or to the substance water, or etc].  [In contrast] 
Criteria of table-identity are conceived of (by me, anyway) as to some 
extent up to us.  [Whereas] Facts about “=” are not (in Kripke's view, 
anyway) at all up to us. 
 
Taken at his word here, Putnam seems to be saying that there are mind-dependent 
cross-world identity facts: that whether a thing A in world w1 is identical to the thing 
B in world w2 is something that we can decide.  That is an anti-realist view.  It is 
necessary that water is H2O because in every world w, the substance in w that is 
identical to the substance in our world picked out by ‘water’ is also identical to the 
substance in our world picked out by ‘H2O’.  But Putnam’s view seems to be that 
these cross-world identities hold in virtue of some decision of ours, so it is a mind-
dependent fact that water is necessarily H2O.  Had we made different decisions, or 
had there been no mental activity at all, these facts concerning cross-world identities 
would not have held.  Now maybe this is a misrepresentative passage of Putnam, and 
that he doesn’t literally mean to be endorsing the mind-dependence of cross-world 
identity facts; but even so, we can see what an anti-realist position concerning the 
necessary a posteriori would amount to. 
 
                                                 
12 Lewis (2001, p611) 
13 Putnam (1990,  p64) 
14 ibid. p63-64 
15 ibid. p67 
Possible worlds and the source of necessity 
 
We have contrasted three approaches to modality – ontological, deflationary and anti-
realist – as they apply to modal properties and the necessary a posteriori.  For my 
money, the best position in either case is the deflationary position; ontological 
positions err by making modality too special, anti-realist positions err by making it 
not special enough.  In this section I want to try and use the threefold distinction to 
suggest that a certain seemingly pressing problem in modal metaphysics is far more 
tractable than it has often appeared. 
 
The problem is that of the source of modal truth: what makes it the case that some 
propositions are necessary, and some merely possible?  The way things are seems 
only to account for what is in fact the case, not what must be the case, or could have 
been the case but isn’t.  Now one way to answer the problem is to be a Lewisian 
realist.  For Lewis, providing an ontological grounding for modal claims is as easy as 
providing one for non-modal claims: modal claims are grounded in what there is 
unrestrictedly, whereas non-modal claims are grounded in what there actually is. 
Lewis responds to the problem of modal truth in an exactly analogous manner to how 
the eternalist responds to the problem of tensed truth.  Just as the eternalist solves the 
problem of what grounds truths of the form <there were dinosaurs> or <there will be 
Martian colonies> by accepting the existence of past times containing dinosaurs and 
future times containing Martian colonies, so Lewis solves the problem of what 
grounds truths of the form <there could be talking donkeys> by accepting the 
existence of non-actual talking donkeys.16 
 
For a long time I thought this was a major, perhaps decisive, consideration in favour 
of Lewisian realism.  The ersatz possible worlds theorist had no similar solution to the 
problem of modal truth to hand, for familiar reasons: they had to accept as primitive 
the distinction between possible worlds and impossible worlds.  While Lewis can 
happily deny the existence of impossible worlds, and claim therefore that the 
existence of a world containing a talking donkey is a sufficient grounding for the 
possibility of talking donkeys, the ersatzist must seemingly admit impossible worlds 
as well as possible worlds.  If worlds are not concrete spacetimes but sets of 
propositions, say, then there will be sets of propositions that couldn’t all be true 
together just as there will be sets of propositions that could all be true together, and 
similarly if worlds are maximal properties, or world books, or etc.  So the ersatzist 
cannot appeal to the existence of a world in which there is a talking donkey as the 
grounding of <Possibly, there are talking donkeys>.  She must appeal also to the fact 
that this world is possible: that it represents a way things could be as opposed to a 
way things couldn’t be.  But now we are just back to our original problem: what 
grounds this modal truth that this world represents a possibility?  The ersatzist, 
seemingly, has no answer: it simply just is the case that some worlds are possible and 
some not.  This is no better than the presentist claiming that it just is the case that 
some things happened, and not offering a further grounding, and so if the ersatzist 
cannot find anything more illuminating to say we have a strong case for Lewisian 
realism. 
 
                                                 
16 The analogy between the problems faced by the presentist in accounting for tensed truths and the 
actualist in accounting for modal truths is discussed by Sider (2001, p40-41) and (2003, p185). 
As I said, I used to doubt that the ersatzist could say anything more illuminating, and I 
took this as a strong reason to prefer Lewisian realism, or perhaps to move towards a 
non-cognitivist position on modality; but now I think that the deflationist offers hope 
to the ersatzist.  Reflect on what the problem is meant to be for the ersatzist: they need 
to say what it is in virtue of which a certain proper subset of all the worlds that there 
are represent a way things could be, and the only answer that seems available to them 
is that they are the possible worlds and not the impossible worlds.  But why is this 
meant to be bad? 
 
I think the worry being levelled against the ersatzer stems from the thought that there 
must be something special about the possible worlds that the impossible worlds lack, 
and that the ersatzer faces the challenge of accounting for why some worlds and not 
others have this special status.  It is as if the possible worlds had some sort of 
metaphysical ‘glow’ – the glow of possibility – that the impossible worlds lacked.  If 
that were right the ersatzist would indeed have to face the hard task of accounting for 
why some worlds glowed and others didn’t: in virtue of what is this world a glowing 
world and not a non-glowing world?  But that worry takes the ersatzist to be an 
ontological theorist.  If there really were anything akin to a glow this would mean that 
there would be a natural division between the possible and the impossible worlds that 
reality carves by making some worlds glowing worlds and some worlds non-glowing 
worlds.  But while the ersatzist could hold such a theory, they needn’t do so.  More 
attractive, to my mind, is the thought that while there is a genuine, mind-independent, 
distinction between the possible worlds and the impossible worlds, it is a highly 
unnatural distinction: one that we latch on to with our modal vocabulary not because 
of any intrinsic eligibility enjoyed by that distinction between the worlds (as opposed 
to some other distinction: one that drew a different boundary between worlds), but 
because of our interests.17 
 
An example of the kind of deflationary view I have in mind is the neo-
conventionalism of Ted Sider.18  Traditionally, the conventionalist claims that the 
necessary truths are those which are true by convention (or true in virtue of 
convention).  But this theory is hopeless.  What is a matter of convention is that 
sentences express the propositions they do, for we could have used the same sentences 
to say something different.  So if a sentence S expresses a truth then in this sense it 
does so in virtue of convention; we could have used S to express a falsehood.  But in 
this sense every true sentence is true by convention; no distinction is carved between 
the necessary and the contingent.  If such a distinction is to be drawn then the sense of 
‘true by convention’ the conventionalist is interested in must not simply be the trivial 
sense in which all sentences are true by convention; rather, the conventionalist must 
hold that there is a notion of ‘true by convention’ such that not only is it a result of 
convention that a sentence S expresses a truth but that it is a result of convention that 
the truth expressed by S is true.  So while a contingent sentence S and a necessary 
sentence S* are both ‘true by convention’ in the sense that we could have used those 
sentences to express falsehoods, the truth expressed by S* but not the truth expressed 
                                                 
17 What these interests are, and why we single out certain kinds of proposition in this way, is another 
question.  A satisfactory answer to it would require a discussion of the purpose of modalizing, which is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
18 Sider (2003) 
by S holds in virtue of convention.  It is in this sense that the necessary truths are true 
by convention. 
 
But that is simply false.  It is not true by convention in this sense that 2+2=4 or that 
all bachelors are unmarried etc; those claims are true in virtue of what numbers and 
bachelors are like.  Every sentence is such that the fact that it expresses the 
proposition it does is a matter of convention, but every true proposition is true in 
virtue of how the world is.  The only propositions that we could legitimately claim are 
true by convention in this required sense, then, are those that say something about 
conventions: e.g. that there are conventions, or that such-and-such a convention holds, 
etc.  Those propositions are true by convention, in the same way that the truth that 
there are tables is true in virtue of the tables.  So it is not the necessary propositions 
that are true by convention in this sense; it is this small subset of the contingent 
propositions that are about conventions. 
 
Sider offers us a variant on conventionalism that abandons the useless notion of truth 
in virtue of convention.  Sider’s thought is this: that it is not true by convention that 
2+2=4, but rather a matter of convention that this truth is a necessary truth.  The idea 
is that there is not something special (some glow of necessity) that the proposition 
<2+2=4> has that the proposition <there are monkeys> lacks; it is simply that the 
conventions governing our modal language pick out the former and not the latter as a 
necessary truth.  This is a deflationist view of modality.  There is nothing special 
about the truths of maths, or analytic truths, or natural kind identities, etc, that we are 
latching on to when we single them out as necessary truths, it’s just that we consider 
such propositions important, and so we use our modal language to accord them 
special status. 
 
This is not a mind-dependence account.  It is a wholly mind-independent matter that 
<2+2=4> is necessary and <there are monkeys> contingent.  The property that 
<2+2=4> has and <there are monkeys> lacks would have been had by the former and 
lacked by the latter even if there had been no mental activity at all.  The deflationist 
position is simply that this property is not a natural one; according to Sider it is a 
highly disjunctive property (many of the disjuncts of which are not even that natural): 
it is the property of being a truth of mathematics, or a truth of natural kind identity, or 
etc. 
 
Let us return now to the alleged problem of accounting for the source of modality.  
We are asked: what makes these worlds possible and these worlds impossible?  I 
answer: just that the first are possible.  By this I mean that there is nothing more to the 
distinction between the worlds than that the first group are the ones we single out as 
the possible worlds.  This is not to say that there is no mind-independent distinction 
between the two groups of worlds, no property that every world in the first group has 
and every world in the second group lacks.  There is such a property, although it is 
hard to state: it is the property of representing things as being thus-and-so, or thus-
and-so, or etc.  But of course, for any distinction that you drew among the totality of 
worlds there would be such a property. 
 
The deflationist holds that there is nothing ontologically special about this distinction 
as opposed to the myriad other distinctions that we could have latched on to.  We 
draw the distinction where we do not because it is more eligible than any of the other 
distinctions but because of our interests.  There seems, then, to be nothing more 
required in accounting for why these worlds are the possible worlds than to account 
for why they occur on one side of the division we draw rather than the other, and that 
is easy to account for. 
 
Suppose I am presented with a group of people and I point to a sub-group of them and 
call them the Φs, with the remaining members of the group being the non-Φs.  If you 
ask me in virtue of what a non-Φ is a non-Φ the answer is obviously just that they 
weren’t in the group I singled out as the Φs; there is nothing more to be said.  
Likewise, if I single out a sub-group of all the worlds, not by pointing to them 
explicitly but by mentioning certain features of them – such as representing the 
mathematical truths as true, not making false actually true kind identities, etc – and I 
call the worlds in this sub-group the possible worlds, there is nothing more to be said 
about why they are the possible worlds than that they are in the group I singled out to 
be called that.  Explanation stops there.  We would only owe a further explanation if 
we thought that the distinction we were drawing was latching on to some natural joint 
between the worlds; then we would need to account for why some worlds had this 
natural property and others didn’t.  But this is exactly what the deflationist rejects. 
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